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611 
Introduction to the 
2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium: 
Trolls or Toll-Takers: Do Intellectual 
Property Non-practicing Entities Add Value 
to Society? 
Samuel F. Ernst* 
There are few areas of patent law more contentious than the 
dispute over the social utility of “non-practicing entities,” or 
(if you will excuse the expression) “patent trolls.”1 Generally 
speaking, patent trolls are companies that acquire patents, not 
for the purpose of developing new technologies and creating jobs, 
but for the sole purpose of demanding royalties (through 
litigation if necessary) from those companies that do release 
products on the market. Whether non-practicing entities add 
value to society is a topic of much debate, and the focus of the 
2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium. 
On the one hand, there has been no shortage of 
condemnation of patent trolls from the legal community. One 
study reported that patent trolls imposed direct litigation costs 
on defendants of $29 billion in 2011 alone.2 This stunning figure 
does not even include the indirect costs of litigation (for example, 
the cost of manpower directed away from useful activities when 
engineers must assist in collecting discovery, giving depositions, 
investigating non-infringement and invalidity defenses, and so 
forth; and the jobs that could be preserved or created with the 
money spent on defending litigation). Nor does this figure include 
the substantial amount of royalties paid to patent trolls in 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. 
 1 And some scholars will not excuse that expression. James F. McDonough argues 
that the term “patent dealers” is a “[a] more suitable, market-contextual term for 
nonpracticing patent owners who license or enforce their patents.” James F. McDonough 
III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent 
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 201 (2006). Robin Feldman and her 
colleagues prefer the term “patent monetization entities.” Robin Feldman, Tom 
Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 
UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 1, 16. 
 2 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014). 
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licensing negotiations to avoid the prospect of costly litigation.3 
Robin Feldman and her colleagues estimate that patent trolls 
filed 58.7% of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2012, and 
observe that trolls frequently target startup companies in the 
internet and technology sectors4—companies that are just 
embarking on the path to innovation and cannot afford to defend 
themselves even if the asserted patents are plainly invalid or not 
infringed.  
In this vein, commentators condemn patent trolls as “bottom 
feeders” who acquire and assert low-value patents, calculating 
that the high cost of litigation will result in an early settlement.5 
Patent trolls are able to drive up the cost of litigation with 
impunity. They can demand expensive discovery but are immune 
to counterattacks because they produce no products that can be 
the target of patent infringement counterclaims and have little 
information to discover, given that they are small companies or 
even shell corporations with little or no employees.  
Indeed, whereas most areas of patent law are arcane and 
abstract, patent trolls have failed to escape the attention of even 
the President of the United States, who has complained that 
patent trolls “don’t actually produce anything themselves. 
They’re just trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody 
else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of them.”6 
And condemnation of patent trolls appears to be one area on 
which the two parties can agree. Vox reports that “[t]he incoming 
Republican chairmen of both the House and Senate Judiciary 
committees have signaled their support for patent legislation. 
And they largely see eye to eye with President Obama, who has 
also called for reform.”7 In support of such reforms, Senator Orrin 
 
 3 See id. at 409. 
 4 Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 1, at 13 (citing John R. Allison et al., Patent 
Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 6); Colleen Chien, Startups and 
Patent Trolls 1 (Sept. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at digitalcommons. 
law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=facpubs. 
 5 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013). The authors identify two other varieties of patent 
trolls: “lottery ticket” trolls own a patent they believe reads on a wide swath of technology 
and hope to “hit it big” with a large jury award; “patent aggregators” collect many 
thousands of patents and are able to force companies to take licenses without litigation 
because it is infeasible and prohibitively expensive to defend against such a sheer number 
of patents, regardless of whether they are valid or infringed. Id. at 2126−27. 
 6 Mike Masnick, President Obama Admits that Patent Trolls Just Try to ‘Extort’ 
Money; Reform Needed, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/2013 
0214/14351821988/president-obama-admits-that-patent-trolls-just-try-to-extort-money-ref 
orm-needed.shtml. 
 7 Timothy B. Lee, Senate Republicans Are Getting Ready to Declare War on Patent 
Trolls, VOX (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/11/20/7251877/republican-
patent-troll-fight. 
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Hatch recently said, “Patent trolls – which are often shell 
companies that do not make or sell anything – are crippling 
innovation and growth across all sectors of our economy.”8 
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the 
criticism of patent trolls is misguided. James F. McDonough 
forcefully argues that patent trolls (or patent dealers, as 
McDonough calls them) benefit society by providing liquidity, 
market clearing, and increased efficiency to the market for 
patents.9 The evolution of an efficient market for innovation gives 
inventors an incentive to invent and gives the public “easier and 
broader access to inventions.”10 Hence, patent trolls help to 
effectuate the goal of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.”11  
In a wholly different vein, Mark Lemley and A. Douglas 
Melamed argue that those who focus their energy on attacking 
patent trolls are “missing the forest for the trolls.”12 While patent 
trolls are a large and growing problem, they are merely 
“a symptom of systemic issues the patent system faces in the IT 
industry—too many patents interpreted too broadly, a remedy 
system that routinely awards excessive damages and enables 
patent holders to bargain for excessively costly settlements, and 
an enormous royalty stacking problem.”13 Professor Lemley and 
Mr. Melamed further argue that “[p]racticing entities, as well as 
trolls, can and do take advantage of these issues.”14 
The 2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium will seek to 
advance the discussion of non-practicing entities in three 
ways: (1) by expanding on the scholarly debate surrounding 
patent trolls summarized above; (2) by expanding on the 
perspectives informing this debate beyond academia by inviting 
the views of practitioners from both sides of the patent troll 
divide; and (3) by expanding on the scope of this topic by 
considering the nature and possibility of copyright and 
trademark trolls. 
First, I will moderate a panel of distinguished patent law 
scholars will expand upon and further develop the debate 
 
 8 Id. (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)). 
 9 McDonough, supra note 1, at 216–18.  
 10 Id. at 223. 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. 
 12 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 5, at 2121. 
 13 Id. at 2180. 
 14 Id. 
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summarized above with new data and theories on the issue of 
patent trolls: 
– Professor Robin Feldman will assess the impact of patent 
trolls on the business and legal landscape of the country 
and consider common law, regulatory, and legislative 
responses to the problem.15 
– Professor Amy L. Landers will explore how patent trolls 
are creating a “bubble” in the value of patents, the 
bursting of which could have destabilizing, negative 
consequences for investment in research and 
development.16 
– Professor Brian L. Frye will argue that we should stop 
using intellectual property metaphors, such as “patent 
troll.”  These metaphors describe intellectual property as 
an expression of moral values, which prevents us from 
understanding the connection between intellectual 
property’s theoretical welfarist justification and its actual 
scope.17 
– Professor Ryan T. Holte will analyze in detail the 
Supreme Court case of eBay v. MercExchange, arguing 
that the case is improperly understood as creating a firm 
rule that non-practicing entities cannot obtain injunctive 
relief; and that this misunderstanding was caused in part 
by eBay’s marketing and public relations efforts and the 
settlement of the case before the Federal Circuit could 
render a final ruling on the case.18  
Second, a distinguished panel of patent law practitioners and 
policy makers will debate the effect of non-practicing entities on 
industry. This panel will include: 
– Congressman Dana Rohrabacher of California’s 
Forty-Eighth Congressional District; 
– Robert D. Fish, a partner at Fish & Tsang LLP, who 
litigates patent cases;  
– Lee Cheng, the Chief Legal Officer of the technology 
company Newegg Inc.; 
 
 15 See Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities and the Shifting 
Legal Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635 (2015). 
 16 See Amy L. Landers, Private Value Determinations and the Potential Effect on the 
Future of Research and Development, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 647 (2015). 
 17 See Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735 (2015). 
 18  See Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An 
Analysis of the Case History, Precendent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677 (2015). 
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– Ian D. McClure, the Director of Intellectual Property 
Exchange International, Inc., a company that describes 
itself as “the World’s First Financial Exchange for 
Licensing and Trading Intellectual Property Rights;”19 
 Mr. McClure argues that NPEs have been essential in 
the development of patent rights as an asset class and 
article of trade, and that NPEs should next develop “best 
practices” to provide greater transparency through a 
central marketplace;20 and 
– Nathan Shafroth, a partner at Covington & Burling LLP 
who litigates patent cases. 
– John B. Sganga, Jr., a partner at Knobbe, Martens, Olson 
& Bear, LLP who litigates patent cases and teaches at 
the Fowler School of Law, will moderate this panel. 
Third, a distinguished panel of copyright and trademark 
scholars and practitioners will expand this discussion to consider 
the nature and existence of “soft IP” trolls: 
– Professor Tom W. Bell will examine the emergence of 
“copyright pornography trolls,” who sue thousands of 
John Doe defendants with the hopes of netting millions 
in settlement payments from the guilty and innocent 
alike. Professor Bell will also examine the use of taxi 
medallions to pursue networked transportation 
companies such as Uber and Lyft. Professor Bell argues 
that these types of vexatious conflicts result from the 
mistreatment of statutory and regulatory privileges as 
property rights.21 
– Professor Michael S. Mireles will explore how trademark 
law has addressed the problem of non-practicing entities 
through laws and regulations in areas such as Internet 
domain registration and Patent and Trademark Office 
inter partes proceedings.22 
– Chris Arledge, the Co-founder and Managing Partner of 
One LLP, Brad Greenberg of Columbia Law School, and 
Lindy Herman of Fish & Tsang LLP will also contribute 
 
 19 IPXI, https://www.ipxi.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
 20 See Ian D. McClure, From a Patent Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for 
Patents: Benchmarking IP in Its Evolution to Asset Class Status, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 759 
(2015). 
 21 See Tom W. Bell, Copyright Porn Trolls, Wasting Taxi Medallions, and the 
Propriety of “Property”, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 799 (2015). 
 22 See Michael S. Mireles, Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States?, 18 
CHAP. L. REV. 815 (2015). 
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to this panel. It will be moderated by Professor Mary Lee 
Ryan of the Fowler School of Law. 
Finally, we are most honored to have Andrew Byrnes, Chief 
of Staff of the United States Patent and Trademark Office as our 
keynote speaker. Mr. Byrnes will discuss ongoing developments 
relevant to patent applicants and owners, including 
non-practicing entities, and the role of the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office and the Obama Administration in helping to 
ensure the IP system is balanced, effective, and promotes 
innovation.23 
 
 
 23 See Andrew Byrnes, Chief of Staff, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Keynote 
Address at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Standing Sentinel over 
Innovation: The Importance of a Balanced and Effective IP System (Jan. 30, 2015), in 18 
CHAP. L. REV. 617 (2015). 
